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Editorial 
The conference “Environmental Change and Migration: From Vulnerabilities to Capabilities” 
was the first of a new conference series on “Environmental Degradation, Conflict and Forced 
Migration”. It was organised by the European Science Foundation, the Bielefeld University 
and its Center for Interdisciplinary Research. The Center on Migration, Citizenship and De-
velopment (COMCAD), the Universities’ unit responsible for scientific content and quality of 
the conference, has launched a COMCAD Working Paper Series on “Environmental Degra-
dation and Migration”. The new series intends to give conference participants the opportunity 
to share their research with an even broader audience. 
The symposium focused on how environmental change impacts the nexus between vulner-
abilities on the one hand and capabilities on the other hand, and how this relationship affects 
mobility patterns. Although the conference organizers chose to include all kinds of environ-
mental change and types of migration, climate change figured prominently among the sub-
missions to the conference. Therefore, the conference aimed to bring together the perspec-
tives from climate change, vulnerability, and migration studies, and to draw conclusions 
about the political implications of the knowledge scientists currently have available. Toward 
that goal, the conference was structured along three pillars. The first concentrated on climate 
change and the vulnerability of certain regions and groups. It covered case studies as well as 
different approaches for making climate change projections and assessing the likelihood of 
vulnerability. The second pillar focused on empirical research on environmentally induced 
migration from a vulnerabilities perspective, but acknowledged the occasionally strong ele-
ments of capability within it. In this way, the aim was to learn about approaches and options 
to support existing capabilities. The third pillar was concerned with the opportunities and pit-
falls of policy options in dealing with the future challenge of climate induced displacement, 
and with the analysis of dominant public discourses within the field. 
The researchers invited represented a wide range of disciplines, including sociology, social 
anthropology, migration, conflict, gender and development studies, geography, political sci-
ence, international law, and climate and environmental science. The conference was also 
well balanced in terms of geographic origin, gender, and academic status of the participants. 
The conference programme and full report can be found at www.esf.org/conferences/10328. 
 
Bielefeld, February 2011       Jeanette Schade and Thomas Faist  
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Abstract 
Climate change and international migration flows are phenomena which attract a great deal 
of attention from policymakers, researchers and the general public around the globe. Are 
these two phenomena related? Is migration an adaptation strategy to sudden or gradual 
changes in climate? In this paper our aim is to investigate whether countries that are affected 
by climatic anomalies with respect to long-term mean experience, ceteris paribus, larger 
outmigration flows toward rich OECD countries in the period 1990-2001. Contrarily to the 
bulk of existing studies we use a macro approach and analyse the determinants of interna-
tional bilateral migration flows employing an augmented gravity-like equation and test the 
relevance of climate anomalies with respect to long-term average temperature and precipita-
tion. One important novelty in our approach is the explicit consideration in the empirical 
analysis of the heterogeneous nature of climate shocks, i.e. positive vs. negative variations 
of temperature and precipitations; non linear and threshold effects of climate shocks. Our 
results show that the occurrence of climate anomalies in origin countries might have hetero-
geneous impacts on cross-border outmigration flows depending on the type and size of the 
shocks and on certain socio-economic characteristics of the country (level of development, 
past immigration history, vulnerability of the agricultural sector). In general, countries with a 
higher level of development and with a growing share of irrigated agricultural land are less 
sensitive to climate anomalies. Interestingly we find that the existence of a network of estab-
lished migrants plays a complex role. In fact,  in case of certain climate shocks - such as 
non-extreme temperature anomalies and positive precipitation anomalies of large size - net-
works makes origin countries more resilient to climate shocks; hence they help affected 
countries to cope with climate shocks (for instance through remittance inflows as docu-
mented in other studies). We also find that in case of other climatic events  - negative precipi-
tation anomalies and extreme temperature anomalies – the existence of a large network of 
migrants is positively related with the subsequent size of international migration outflow. Al-
though the analysis conducted is far from being conclusive on the complex relationship be-
tween climate change and migration, it offers interesting insights and calls for complementary 
methodological approaches. 
This research has been conducted within the CIRCE (Climate Change and Impact Research: the Mediterranean 
Environment) project funded by the European Commission Contract No 036961 GOCE. 
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1. Introduction  
The debate on climate change attracts a great deal of attention from policymakers, research-
ers and the general public around the globe. Although there is still a large degree of uncer-
tainty on future climate scenario, there is a growing consensus in the scientific community 
that substantial changes in climatic conditions – including a growing frequency of extreme 
weather events - will occur. 
Our knowledge on the potential socio-economic impacts of climate change is still limited not 
only as a consequence of uncertainty over future scenario but also as a consequence of the 
complex and heterogeneous behaviour of individuals and communities affected by climatic 
shocks. The complexity of adaptation dynamics (or resilience/vulnerability to changes) is well 
identified in the IPCC 2007 report: “Barriers, limits and costs of adaptation are not fully un-
derstood, partly because effective adaptation measures are highly dependent on specific 
geographical and climate risk factors as well as institutional, political and financial con-
straints” (IPCC 2007, Ch. 17). 
In fact individuals might put in place different adaptation strategies in order to cope with the 
consequences of climate change. One of the adaptation strategies that raises a lot of con-
cern is migration. The anxiety of governments and public opinion is not surprising given the 
relevant economic and social consequences of immigration flows both in sending and receiv-
ing areas/countries.  
Human mobility is one among several possible adaptation strategies and it is fundamental to 
understand under which conditions migration is the preferred option, for which individuals 
within a community affected by adverse climatic conditions and which kind of migration (if 
any) is more likely to be observed (international or internal; temporary or permanent). Only 
few studies have tried to answer to these questions and quantify the links between the two 
phenomena, in particular as a consequence of the limited availability of reliable data on mi-
gration flows. A growing research effort has been devoted more recently to these research 
issues with different methodological approaches (see Piguet 2010 for a survey). Case stud-
ies and household-level surveys have contributed to our knowledge on the microlevel deci-
sions and behaviours of individuals and communities affected by climate shocks. Although 
insightful, these studies give us findings that are highly heterogeneous (and often contradic-
tory) given their unavoidable case specific nature. 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
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In this paper we take a macro-approach and our aim is to investigate whether countries that 
are affected by climatic anomalies experience, ceteris paribus, larger outmigration flows to-
ward rich OECD countries. Hence we focus on country-level data and our interest is re-
stricted to international immigration flows (and not internal migration).1 In particular, we ana-
lyze the role of climate change as a push factor of international migration flows. We employ a 
modified version of the pseudo-gravity model of Ortega and Peri (2009) in order to investi-
gate the effects of climate shocks of different size and nature on bilateral international migra-
tion from a large sample of emerging and developing countries to OECD countries between 
1990 and 2001.  
Our results show that the occurrence of climate anomalies in origin countries might have 
heterogeneous impacts on outmigration flows depending on the type and size of climate 
shocks and on the socio-economic characteristics of the country (level of development, past 
immigration history, vulnerability of the agricultural sector). In general, countries with a lower 
level of development and with scarce investment in irrigation are more sensitive to climate 
anomalies. Interestingly we find that network of established migrants plays a complex role. In 
fact,  in case of certain climate shocks - such as non-extreme temperature anomalies and 
positive precipitation anomalies of large size - networks seems to make origin countries more 
resilient to climate shocks (for instance through remittance inflows as documented in other 
studies). In the occurrence of other climatic events  - negative precipitation anomalies and 
extreme temperature anomalies – the existence of a large network of migrants is positively 
related with the subsequent size of international migration outflow. Hence, established net-
work of migrants play a complex role; they represent both a bridge to new migration flows but 
also a way to cope with the adverse impacts of large shocks. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we briefly discuss the links between climate 
shocks and human mobility and we outline a selective survey of relevant literature. Empirical 
                                               
1
 According to Piguet (2010) a limitation of studies employing our methodological approach is given by the so 
called “ecological fallacy”, ie the fact that “correlations measured at the aggregated level might not hold true at the 
individual level”. We believe that – given our research question – it is irrelevant whether or not migrants are pre-
cisely those who have been directly affected by climate shocks. On the contrary, a micro-level approach might be 
misleading in the sense that it is likely to underestimate the links between climate shocks and geographical relo-
cation since by definition does not observe individuals and communities that are affected only indirectly (for in-
stance through market dynamics, ie changes in price/factor rewards). A macro approach has the merit of being 
able to capture the general equilibrium effects of climate shocks on migration flows.  
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
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analysis on the role of climate anomalies as a determinant of international migration flows is 
presented in Chapter 3. Some conclusive remarks are reported in Chapter 4.  
2. Climate and migration: what are the links? 
Every year in poor and rich countries millions of individuals change their place of residence 
(see SOPEMI 2009 and 2008 for recent data on international migration flows). Human mobil-
ity might assume very different forms: within or across countries, voluntary versus forced, 
temporary versus permanent, legal or illegal. The common trigger in all cases has to be 
found in changes in individual/ family conditions and / or changes in economic and social 
opportunities in origin and destination locations.  
Can we consider changes in climatic conditions as push (or pull) factors of human migration? 
While the answer is certainly positive, the definition of the exact nature and a quantitative 
assessment of the links between climate change and migration is a complex task. Whether a 
change in climatic conditions in a specific location is sufficient enough to induce individuals to 
geographically relocate will depend on multiple factors such as the nature of climatic shocks, 
characteristics of the population affected and the vulnerability of the economic and social 
systems (including the ability to undertake alternative coping strategies).  
Firstly, the vulnerability of individuals to climate change will depend, ceteris paribus, on the 
magnitude and types of climate anomalies. Economic systems – and individuals within them 
– might have different degrees of vulnerability to different kind of climatic shocks (tempera-
tures, precipitations, extreme events).  For instance, extreme climatic events such as 
droughts, floods or hurricanes are likely to have severe impacts - at least in the short run - on 
the economic resources of a given community and, as a consequence, might severely limit 
the adoption of adaptation strategies alternative to migration. On the other hand, gradual 
changes such as the reduction of precipitation over time might have a smaller impact on the 
well being of a community if individuals are able to adjust their productive strategies over 
time (for instance through investments in irrigation systems or use of drought resistant agri-
cultural varieties).  
The economic consequences of climatic changes might also be highly non-linear: the in-
crease in temperature or reduced precipitations might have trivial or no effects up to a certain 
threshold and dramatically increase when such limit is crossed. An interesting work by le 
Blanc and Perez (2008), using GIS data on rainfall and population density in Sub-Saharan 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
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Africa for year 2000, shows that water scarcity constraints human density only below a cer-
tain threshold2. This result suggests that vulnerability of population to water stress (caused 
by climatic or population pressures) depends upon the level of water resources.  
Another aspect that should be considered is the asymmetric impacts that climate anomalies 
might have across the affected population. While some individuals or industries might be 
negatively affected, others might benefit (both as a direct consequences of such changes or 
indirect effects taking place through market mechanisms). As recent evidence on adaptation 
strategies in a sample of African countries shows, counteracting effects might be also pre-
sent in highly vulnerable communities. Analysis based on micro-level data on a sample of 
African farmers point out that higher annual temperatures are associated with positive varia-
tion of net revenues for livestock owners and negative variations of net revenues from crop 
production (CEEPA 2008). If climate change affects asymmetrically the productivity or the 
endowment of different factors of production (labour, capital, land) also the structure of pro-
duction and factors’ rewards will change in a asymmetric way.  
The choice on whether to undertake or not adaptation strategies (including outmigration) will 
also depend on the perceived duration of climate anomalies (ad its consequences). Given 
that migration is a costly adaptation strategy – in particular migration across borders – if indi-
viduals perceive changes as transitory they might decide to adopt alternative strategies (or 
adopt a “wait and see” strategy and post-pone the migration decision) even if the climatic 
changes are highly destructive. On the contrary, if changes are perceived as permanent they 
might be more inclined to opt for costly but resolving adaptation strategies. Halliday (2006) 
provides evidence which might support this idea. Using data on a panel of rural household 
from El Salvador the author finds that while adverse agricultural shocks (harvest and live-
stock loss) increase migration toward the US, the damages caused by the 2001 earthquake 
are associated to a reduced probability of outmigration. The transitory nature of the latter 
shock might be a possible explanation for such heterogeneous reaction.3 
                                               
2
 The authors finds that above a mean annual runoff of 900mm rainfall and human density are not correlated. 
Note that, as the authors point out, sixty percent of the population in Africa lives in zones with mean annual run-
offs of less that 300mm.  
3
 The author suggests another possible explanation associated to the different labor market effects of the shocks. 
“One explanation is that the earthquakes created exigencies in El Salvador that increased the incentives for fami-
lies to retain labor at home” (page 895, Halliday 2006). The two explanations need not be substitute but they go in 
the same direction: in fact if the destructive event is perceived to be permanent then the incentive for families to 
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In order to analyse the effects of climate anomalies on migration it is important to distinguish 
direct effects from indirect channels which produce their effects on migration flows via other 
push and pull factors. In Figure 2.1, we report a schematic representation. Changes in cli-
matic conditions could have both direct effects as push factors of migration flows when the 
possibility of human survival in the “new” environment are reduced (for instance because of 
unsustainable water supplies) or indirect effects through market forces.4  Migration might be 
induced by changes in quality of life5, economic opportunities or a combination of both set of 
factors. If climate change affects the endowment and efficiency of productive factors, then 
both factors’ prices and prices of final goods and services would also change. 
                                                                                                                                                   
retain labor at home  would be weak. 
4
 Indirect changes can also occur through non market forces. Environmental degradation has often been one 
important factor behind social conflicts (see the interesting work by Reuveny 2007). Also in these cases, it is often 
possible to track back the occurrence of social conflict and wars to the economic and re-distributive conse-
quences of climate shocks. 
5
 There is a rich literature on the role of climatic amenities in affecting migration (or population growth in general). 
Cebula (2005) finds that gross state in-migration in the US over the period 1999-2002 is an increasing function of 
warmer temperatures, sunshine and recreation possibilities. Cheshire and Magrini (2005) show that urban popula-
tion growth in EU countries is positively related to good climate but spatial variations seems to matter only within 
national borders: individuals do not respond to differences in weather conditions by cross-border relocation.  
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Figure 2.1 – Climate changes and migration: a map of direct and indirect links 
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Economic systems might be highly resilient to climate-related shocks. In particular in urban 
areas where agglomeration forces are strong and exert a centripetal force on productive fac-
tors (including labour). The strength of agglomeration externalities can be appreciated by 
looking at how cities recover from devastating shocks as reported in Figure 2.2, taken from 
Vigdor (2008). In the figure, population trend pre- and post-shocks are reported for seven 
cities hit, in different times, by natural or man-made disasters of high magnitude. Cities that 
were growing before the event in all cases considered by Vigdor continued their positive 
trend also in the aftermath of disasters (even in the case of the extremely strong earthquake 
of San Francisco which left homeless more than half of the population. The same pattern is 
observed in the case of shocks with more long lasting effects on environmental conditions 
(such as radiations from the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). In many cases the 
adjustment was not particularly quick, and in the case of Dresden a complete rebound to pre-
shock levels is not observed. Davies and Weinstein (2002) use the “exogenous” events of 
bombing of Japanese cities during WWI in order to assess competing theory of urban 
growth. In their analysis they find a highly persistent relative structure of the urban system 
with an almost complete rebound to pre-bombing equilibrium by 1960s. A similar study by 
Bosker et al (2008) on bombing of German cities in WWI finds evidence of recovering in ab-
solute term but also some non-transitory effects on relative city size (population size relative 
to cities not, or less, affected by the shocks). 
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Figure 2.2 – Disasters and the persistence of City Population trends 
 
These examples suggest that urban externalities might imply high resilience to (climatic or 
other) shocks. A key role in determining the population pattern is played by the degree of 
factors’ mobility. Only when factors (capital and / or labour) are geographically mobile, also 
small changes in prices can drive large shifts in the geography of production.6  
Different levels of resilience – for instance between urban and rural areas – imply that the 
ability to undertake different adaptation strategies is highly heterogeneous across communi-
ties. Qualitative analysis undertaken using ethnographic methods suggests that the degree 
of resilience – and hence the choice of migration as an adaptation strategy – is highly het-
erogeneous also across individuals. Reuveny (2007) argues that “people can adapt to envi-
                                               
6
 Further insights can be gained by analysing the potential effects of climatic shocks within the so-called New 
Economic Geography (NEG) literature. The NEG was pioneered by the Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman in 1991 
and further developed by other scholars (among others Richard Baldwin, Tony Venables, Ian Wooton, Gianmarco 
Ottaviano, Jaques Thisse, Masahita Fujita). For a survey see Baldwin R., Forslid R., Martin P., Ottaviano G. and 
F. Robert-Nicoud (2003), Economic Geography and Public Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
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ronmental problem in three ways: stay in place and do nothing, accepting the costs; stay in 
place and mitigate the changes; or leave affected areas” (page 657). The cost and benefits 
of each option will largely depend on individual’s actual resources (which might be affected 
or not by environmental changes), future expectations and the (partly-exogenous) institu-
tional framework within which the environmental shock takes place. Individuals and house-
holds with a larger endowment of resources (financial assets, land and other capital goods, 
human capital, social capital or “relationship capital”7) are more likely to undertake adaptation 
strategies rather than do nothing but it is not necessarily the migration strategy the one that 
will be selected. For instance, individuals with large endowments of immobile capital (such as 
land or real estates) are probably less mobile than individuals with only a limited amount of 
capital or who derive their income only from labour. Individuals with high level of human capi-
tal might have a relative low cost of access to new technologies or productive processes 
which overcome the negative consequences of climate change. 
One particular form of  “relationship capital” is the possibility for the individual to rely on a 
network of family and friends who reside in other locations (migration networks). The effect of 
this form of capital on migration propensities might be ambiguous: in fact while, on one hand, 
the network might exercise a strong pull effects reducing migration costs, on the other hand 
external support (for instance in the form of remittances) might facilitate the adoption of other 
coping strategies. Yang and Choi (2007) using household level data from the Philippines find 
that remittance flows increase as a consequence of rainfall shocks (replacing up to 60% of 
the decline in household income). Findley (1994) in a study on migration from rural Mali after 
the severe 1983-85 drought finds no evidence of increased international migration and 
Findley and Sow (1998) find that food deficit in rural households in Mali were compensated 
by remittances from migrants in France. These findings confirm the role of remittances (a 
consequence of established networks) as an insurance mechanism against income shocks. 
On the opposite side, the studies by McLeman on the drought in Oklahoma during the 1930s 
suggest that networks played a role of “bridge” and favoured the adoption of migration as a 
coping strategy (McLeman 2006; McLeman and Smit 2006).  
Another important element that might play a significant role in the nexus between climate 
change and migration is public policy responses both before  - such as pre-emptive meas-
ures and insurance mechanisms that limit the vulnerability to or the consequences of shocks 
                                               
7
 Here we define relationship capital as the potential economic value derived from individuals’ (weak and strong) 
ties with other individuals who reside in the same location or in other locations not affected by climatic changes. 
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– and after the environmental damages occur (emergency help, financial subsidies and aid, 
recovery plans etc.). Good governance will generally limit the extent of damages and reduce 
the number of individuals who will adopt migration strategies. An important role is often 
played by international support. According to a recent paper by Collier and Goderis (2009) 
the level of international aid mitigates the effects of negative shocks but they also find that 
donors do not re-distribute aid overtime toward shock-prone countries. By looking at the con-
sequences of a specific climatic shock, hurricanes, Yang (2008)8 finds that a greater expo-
sure to these events leads, in developing countries, to a large increase in foreign aid. In his 
study, the author considers different types of international financial flows to developing coun-
tries in the aftermath of hurricanes: official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct in-
vestments, remittances, lending from multilateral institutions, portfolio investment and bank 
and trade-related lending. For the poorer countries within his sample, total financial inflows in 
the 3-years following the extreme climatic event represent approximately three-fourths of 
estimated damages. As mentioned above an important role in poorer country is played by 
remittances.  
In general, institutions affect the efficiency of shock-absorption mechanisms both before and 
after the occurrence of climatic changes. According to Reuveny (2007), the role of the US 
federal government was fundamental in limiting out-migration from the US Great Plains in the 
1930s after a series of very severe drought. In fact, the policymakers gave substantial finan-
cial and technological assistance to the farmers who decided to stay in the affected areas.  
2.1 Migration: where? 
The list of factors outlined above gives an idea on the complexity of the nexus between cli-
mate shocks and migration. Another related issue that should be considered is the following: 
if changes in climatic conditions are strong enough to trigger human mobility, which kind of 
moves are we likely to observe? Relocation strategies might be highly different according to 
which individuals are affected and to which environmental episodes we observe.  For those 
individuals who lack the financial resources to finance a costly international move, or for 
those communities who have a weak or inexistent network of established migrants in foreign 
                                               
8
 An interesting innovation of Yang (2008) is the use of a time-varying storm index which allows to take into ac-
count the magnitude of the shocks (proxied by the fraction of the country population affected by the event). 
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locations, migration is likely to be of short distances and within the country. Cross-border 
migration will take place if this option, compared to other adaptation strategies, is not too 
costly. This might happen when the country affected by adverse climatic shocks is geo-
graphically, culturally or socially close to potential receiving countries.9 
The dominance in terms of magnitude of internal migration flows over international flows is a 
stylised fact in migration literature on which there is unanimous consensus. Whatever is the 
determinant of migration, individuals are more sensitive to differentials in socio-economic 
conditions within countries that between them. The existing evidence confirms that this holds 
true also for climatic changes. In Table 2.1 we report information on 38 environmental epi-
sodes which have caused, according to Reuveny (2007), out-migration flows (as a primary 
factor or with other concomitant push factors). In most cases only internal relocation (see 
column 4) takes place and often from rural agricultural areas to urban areas. International 
migration flows of certain relevance are observed less frequently and are almost always in 
border countries (short-distance or toward countries with pre-existing political, ethno linguistic 
or cultural ties).  
Barrios et al (2006) investigate the role of climate change on rural – urban migration in a 
panel of 78 countries over the period 1960-90. Their results outline a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between urbanization and climate change, proxied as changes of an-
nual rainfall from the long-term mean, for Sub-Saharan Africa. No significant results are 
found for other developing countries suggesting that the strength of the link between climate 
change and migration is larger for those communities where agriculture is more vulnerable to 
shortage in rainfall.  
The non-exhaustive list of factors outlined above which mediate the links between climatic 
changes and migration as an adaptation strategy implies that social scientists need to use 
multiple and complementary research strategies to broaden our knowledge on this important 
issue: from case studies on individuals and households in community affected by adverse 
climatic events to econometric analysis on international migration flows (such as the present 
study).  
                                               
9
 Migration might also differ in terms of duration. The move might be temporary (if, for instance the climatic shock 
does not produce long-lasting effects) or permanent. Analysing a sample of irregular migrants crossing Italian 
borders in 2003, Coniglio et al (2009) finds that individuals experiencing adverse climatic shocks or natural disas-
ter in the village of origin are more likely to return home that individuals experiencing social conflicts. 
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In his survey of recent empirical analysis on the links between climate change and migration 
Piguet (2010) discusses relative strengths and limits of alternative methodological ap-
proaches10. In discussing the limits of empirical approaches similar to our study which em-
ploy multivariate methods using geographical areas as unit of analysis (ecological inference 
based on area characteristics) the author mentions two aspects. Firstly, the paucity and qual-
ity of environmental indicators used. In fact most studies employ rather rough and unsophis-
ticated indicators of environmental change (such as past level or anomalies in rainfall). In 
what follows we consider more refined environmental variables which aim at separating cli-
mate anomalies of different size and nature (for example positive versus negative precipita-
tion anomalies or non linear effects of anomalies). The second limit emphasized by Piguet 
(2010) is the so-called ‘ecological fallacy’ due to the fact that “correlations measured at the 
aggregate level might not hold true at individual level” (page 518, Piguet 2010). In our analy-
sis the unit of observation is the individual country and although we acknowledge the fact 
that the impact of climate shocks might differ substantially across subgroups (and even that 
those who migrate might be different from those directly affected by climate shocks) we are 
specifically interested in aggregate net effects and not on individuals’ and communities be-
haviour.  
Bearing in mind the complex links outlined in this section, we present in the following part the 
results of an empirical analysis on the role of (observed) climatic changes on international 
migration flows. 
Table 2.1 – Environmental migration episodes reported in Reuveny (2007) 
Period Origin Destination Cross 
border 
flows 
Environmental push factors Other push factors Number of 
migrants* 
1970s 
- 
1990s  
1. Bangladesh 
(rural areas, coast-
al areas, islands) 
Bangladesh 
(Chittagong Hill 
Tracts) 
 Droughts, water scarcity, 
floods, storms, erosion, deser-
tification  
Overpopulation, underdevel-
opment, government migration 
incentives 
600,000 
1984 - 
1985  
2. Ethiopia: (a) 
central/northern; 
(b) Awash river 
basin-Afar,  
Ethiopia: (a) 
southwest, west; 
(b) Wollo region 
 Drought, famine, forest fires, 
locust invasion 
Underdevelopment, overpopu-
lation, government promotes 
cotton/sugar, overgrazing 
600,000 
early 
1990s 
3. Rwanda (rural 
south, center) 
Rwanda (north), 
Zaire  
yes Arable land/water scarcity, 
land degradation, deforesta-
tion 
Overpopulation, food scarcity, 
civil war, underdevelopment, 
government aid in north 
1.7 Million  
1960s 
- 
4. Mexico and 
Southern Guate-
Mexico (eastern, 
Chiapas) 
yes Land degradation, deforesta-
tion, land pressure 
Persecution, civil war in Gua-
temala, Mexican government 
280,000 
                                               
10
 The author classifies the existing empirical evidence in 7 different types: ecological inference based on area 
characteristics (to which the present study belongs), individual sample surveys, time series, multilevel analysis, 
agent based modelling and qualitative/ethnographic methods.  
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1990s  mala resettlement policy,unequal 
land distribution, overpopula-
tion 
1950s 
- 
current 
5. Bangladesh 
(various regions) 
India, West 
Bengal, Assam, 
Tripura  
yes Droughts, water/land/ food 
scarcity, land erosion, storms, 
salt intrusion 
India’s diversion of Ganges 
River, failure to share river 
water, overpopulation 
12-17 
Million 
1950s 
- 
1980s  
6. El Salvador Honduras up to 
the late 1960s, 
then US 
yes Deforestation, land degrada-
tion, arable land/water scarcity  
Wealth disparity, skewed land-
tenure, poverty, overpopula-
tion, repression 
300,000 to 
Honduras, 
500,000 to 
US 
1960s 
- 
1980s  
7. Ethiopia/ Eritrea Southern Sudan  yes Droughts, famines  Underdevelopment, Eritrean 
secession, war 
1.1 Million  
1980s 
- 
1990s  
8. Mauritania,  Senegal, Sene-
gal River Valley  
yes Drought, soil erosion, deserti-
fication, deforestation, water 
scarcity 
Moors-African enmity, inter-
state war, Senegal river dam 
raises land values and stakes, 
population growth 
69,000 
late 
1970s  
9. Somalia Somalia - Ethio-
pia border re-
gion (Ogaden) 
yes Arable/grazing land degrada-
tion, water scarcity 
Underdevelopment, population 
growth, interstate war 
400,000 
1970s 
- 
1990s  
10. Haiti (north)  Rural hillsides, 
l’Artibonite 
region, cities, 
Dominican 
Republic, US  
yes Deforestation, land scar-
city/degradation, erosion  
Poverty, inequality, high den-
sity, repression 
1.3 Million  
1970s 
- 
1990s  
11. Philippines 
(lowlands) 
Philippines 
(center, up-
lands) 
 Arable land/water scarcity, 
deforestation, floods, slides, 
drought, land degradation 
Overpopulation, land/wealth 
disparity, vague property 
rights, unemployment, under-
development  
4.3 Million  
1970s 
- 
1980s  
12. South Africa 
(black areas) 
South Africa 
(urban centers) 
 Land degradation, deforesta-
tion, subsistence crisis, water 
scarcity 
Repression, poverty, poor 
infrastructure, African unem-
ployment, overpopulation 
Up to 
750,000 
per year  
late 
1960s 
- 
1980s  
13. Sahel (rural 
areas) 
Sahel (urban 
regions, neigh-
boring coastal 
states) 
yes Droughts, famines, land scar-
city  
Inflation, underdevelopment, 
overgrazing  
10 Million  
1960s 
- 
current 
14. Brazil (north-
east) 
Brazil (central 
and southern 
Amazon region) 
 Droughts, land degradation, 
water scarcity, deforestation  
Overpopulation, poverty, land 
disparity, government subsi-
dizes settlers, vague property 
rights  
8 Million  
1970s 
- 
1980s  
15. Sudan (north, 
south, west) 
Sudan (Khar-
toum, Central, 
Kordofan, east) 
 Droughts, famine, desertifica-
tion, deforestation, erosion  
Civil war, underdevelopment, 
policies against small farms 
and pastoralism, population 
growth 
3.5 - 4 
Million by 
early 1990  
1930s  16. US (Great 
Plains) 
US (other re-
gions)  
 Droughts, sand storms, land 
degradation 
Great Depression, over-
plowing/grazing  
2.5 Million  
late 
1970s 
17. Ethiopia Ethiopia - Soma-
lia border re-
gion, Ogaden 
yes Grazing/arable land degrada-
tion, deforestation 
Overpopulation, Ogaden War, 
land disparity, underdevelop-
ment 
450,000 
1970s 
- 
1990s  
18. Nigeria (Jos 
Plateau) 
Nigeria (urban 
areas, intra-
regional) 
 Soil/water/air pollution, silted 
rivers, land scar-
city/degradation 
Tin-mining, poverty, unem-
ployment, high population 
density/growth 
n/a  
1980s 
- 
1990s  
19. Pakistan Pakistan (urban 
areas, especially 
Karachi and 
Islamabad) 
 Water scarcity, deforestation, 
pollution, floods, land degrada-
tion 
Population growth, unequal 
access to resources, poverty, 
unemployment, unclear land-
tenure  
n/a  
1970s 
- 
1990s  
20. Bangladesh 
(rural areas)  
Bangladesh, 
urban centers 
 Droughts, storms, floods, 
water scarcity  
Overpopulation, rural poverty n/a  
1980s 
- 
1990s  
21. China (primar-
ily Gansu and 
Ningxia) 
China (urban 
centers) 
 Floods, land degradation, 
desertification, water scarcity 
Mountainous terrain, poverty, 
malnutrition, government 
incentives 
20 - 30 
Million  
1970s 
- 
1990s  
22. Ecuador (high-
lands, southern 
region) 
Ecuador (north-
ern Amazon) 
 Droughts, deforestation, land 
degradation, water scarcity  
Underdevelopment, construct-
ing oil pipelines in Amazon 
region  
n/a  
1995 - 
2000  
23. North Korea China (urban 
centers) 
yes Floods, tidal waves, droughts, 
land degradation, deforesta-
tion 
Failure of collective farming 
policy, lack of infrastructure, 
poverty 
300,000 - 
400,000  
late 
1980s 
-  mid 
1990s  
24. Somalia Somalia-
Ogaden, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Dji-
bouti  
yes Drought, erosion, deforesta-
tion 
Civil war in Somalia, popula-
tion growth, overgrazing  
2.8 Million  
1950 - 
1980s  
25. Guatemala 
(rural areas)  
Guatemala 
(north Peten 
yes Land degradation, deforesta-
tion, floods, river sedimenta-
Overpopulation, land inequal-
ity, underdevelopment, gov-
100,000 
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region, urban 
centers, eastern 
lowlands, Pacific 
Coast), US 
tion, water scarcity  ernment promoting export 
crops, insurgency 
1940s 
- 
1980s  
26. Dominican 
Republic (Las 
Ayumas) 
Dominican 
Republic (Santi-
ago’s urban 
center) 
 Deforestation, land degrada-
tion 
Coffee price rise stimulates 
deforestation to grow coffee, 
poverty 
Several 
tens of 
thousands  
1931 - 
1939  
27. Canada (Great 
Plains) 
Canada (other 
regions, urban 
areas)  
 Droughts, sand storms, land 
degradation 
Great Depression, over-
plowing/grazing  
300,000 
 28. Mexico (rural 
areas, Oaxaca)  
Mexico (urban 
centers), US 
yes Drought, land degradation, 
water scarcity, deforestation  
Underdevelopment, inequality, 
population growth 
600,000 - 
900,000 
annually 
1960s 
- 
1990s  
29. Kenya (West-
ern, Northern) 
Kenya (Rift 
Valley,some 
remain in West, 
urban centers) 
 Drought, land degradation, 
land scarcity, famine 
Overpopulation, ethnic strife, 
inequality, unemployment 
150,000 - 
200,000  
1970s 
- 2000  
30. Uzbekistan, 
Kazakstan, Aral 
Sea,  
Within region or 
adjacent regions  
yes Pollution, salinization, dust 
storms, water scarcity, sea 
desertification  
Unemployment, underdevel-
opment, ethnic factor, water 
scarcity 
65,000 - 
100,000 
annually  
1990s  31. Caspian Sea 
region, Kalmykia 
Russia, neigh-
boring regions  
yes Inundation, floods, land scar-
city  
Ethnic pull factor, unemploy-
ment, underdevelopment  
2200 - 
8100 an-
nually  
 32. Russia (Kola 
Peninsula) 
Russia (various 
regions) 
 Air pollution  Poor healthcare, social prob-
lems  
5% of 
Population  
 1960s 
- 
2000s  
33. Burkina Faso 
(Mossi Plateau) 
Burkina Faso 
(south, east) 
 Drought  Underdevelopment, population 
pressures  
n/a  
1978 - 
1983  
34. India (west 
Rajasthan, East 
India) 
India (Haryana, 
Madhya Pra-
desh, Madras) 
 Drought  Underdevelopment  n/a  
1980s 
- 
current 
35. Zimbabwe 
(Southern low-
lands) 
Zimbabwe 
(highlands) 
 Drought  Unclear property rights, over-
grazing, poverty, seasonal 
movement 
n/a  
1980s 
- 
1990s  
36. Thailand 
(northeast) 
Thailand (other 
rural, areas, 
urban centers) 
 Deforestation, land scar-
city/degradation  
Underdevelopment  n/a  
1990s  37. Russia (Arctic 
region) 
Russia (urban 
centers), other 
CIS countries  
yes Extreme weather  Socioeconomic decline 70,000 
1950s 
- 
1990s  
38. Tanzania 
(Southern and 
northeast regions) 
Tanzania 
(Usangu Plains) 
 Land scarcity/ degradation  Overpopulation, poverty, 
government promotes com-
mercial agriculture 
84,000 
3. Empirical analysis 
In this section we investigate the determinants of international bilateral migration flows from a 
sample of 165 origin countries toward 25 OECD countries in the period 1990-200111. Our 
main aim is to test the relevance of climate shocks in the origin countries as a push factor of 
bilateral migration flows. We follow a methodological approach similar to Ortega and Peri 
                                               
11
 We use unbalanced data for the sending/origin countries reported in Appendix A. To the best of our knowledge 
comprehensive dataset on bilateral migration flows which include also South-South migration (i.e. migration be-
tween and within less developed and emerging countries) are not available.  
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(2009)12 and use a pseudo-gravity empirical specification. Like in their model the dependent 
variable is the total size of bilateral migration flows. In particular, we estimate the following 
specification: 
ln(Mijt) = β0 + β1Xi,t-1 + β2Zij,t-1 + β3 (ClimateShocksi,t-n) + Di + Dj + Djt + eijt          (1) 
where Mijt is migration flow from origin country i to destination country j at time t13. We intro-
duce a set of push factors operating in the country of origin Xi (GDP per capita, change in 
employment rate and the change in the surface of irrigated land occurred in the year before) 
and our main covariates of interest, ClimateShocksj(t-n) which represent a vector of changes 
of climatic conditions in origin country i. In addition we control for a set of bilateral variables 
Zij,t-1 which greatly affect bilateral migration flows such as geographical distance between 
country i and j, the log of the bilateral stock of migrants from origin country i in destination 
country j, a dummy equals one if the pair of countries share a common language. In order to 
control for time-varying pull factors related to economic, social and policy changes in destina-
tion countries we introduce in the empirical specification a set of country-of-destination-by-
time fixed effects (Djt). These set of dummies will hence absorb any effects specific to the 
OECD destination countries. The specification includes also country of origin and destination 
fixed effects in order to control for time-unvarying characteristics.  
The non-climatic and climatic covariates used in the regression analysis are described in 
Appendix B. With respect to the former, we expect a negative effect of GDP per capita and 
employment rate change on bilateral migration; both variables proxies for economic opportu-
nities in the origin country. Our a priori expectation on the effect of a change in the surface of 
irrigated land is to observe a negative relationship with outmigration. We also expect, as in 
existing studies, that geographical distance is negatively related with bilateral flows between 
origin and destination countries. On the contrary, we expect that a common language and a 
dense network of already established migrants, by reducing the cost of migration and in-
creasing the number and value of opportunities in the destination country, are positively as-
sociated with bilateral flows.  
                                               
12
 Differently from their work, our main focus is on push factors (in particular climate anomalies) rather that pull 
factors such as immigration policy changes. 
13
 When the bilateral flow is zero we add 1 to it before taking the log. 
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Our climatic variables are based on data from Mitchell et al (2003) who provide detailed in-
formation on average precipitation and temperature at country-level for the period 1901-
200014. For each origin country in the dataset we computed a rich set of variables which 
measure climate anomalies – in temperature and precipitation - with respect to the country 
mean during the period 1961-9015. An important novelty of our approach is the explicit con-
sideration in the empirical analysis of the heterogeneous nature of climate shocks (positive 
vs. negative variations of temperature and precipitations; non linear effects of climate anoma-
lies; threshold effects of climatic anomalies; repeated vs. isolated events etc.).16 In particular, 
we test for the relevance of the following climatic variables as push factors of international 
migration flows:  
(i) annual yearly absolute level of precipitation and temperature; 
(ii) precipitation and temperature anomalies with respect to countries’ long-term values (both 
absolute value - in millimeters and Celsius degree respectively - and percentage value); 
(iii) positive and negative anomalies; 
(iv) squared values of anomalies (in order to detect non linear effects); 
(v) persistent anomalies (cumulated values of anomalies in the previous 3 and 5 years); 
(vi) extreme values of climate anomalies.  
Our aim is to overcome the unsatisfactory identification of climatic shocks of previous studies 
(see for instance Barrios et al 2006) which is particularly unfitting in the light of results stem-
ming from a large number of case studies. In fact, as discussed above, the existing qualita-
tive evidence emphasize the highly heterogeneous effects on local communities of climate 
shocks of different nature. 
                                               
14
 TYN CY 1.1 database, Mitchell et al. (2003). Available at: www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timm/cty/obs/TYN_CY_1_1.html 
15
 According to the authors the accuracy of the data is the highest for the time interval 1961-90. 
16
 Some data limitations are unavoidable, in particular we are aware that using yearly data aggregated at the 
country-level might mask high intra-borders variations and seasonal shifts. As other studies have pointed out 
(Moore and Reuveny 2009; Piguet 2010) the complexity of the relationship between climate and migration implies 
that multiple empirical research designs are necessary since a single approach cannot provide compelling an-
swers. 
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The starting point of our analysis is the parsimonious baseline model of bilateral migration 
flows  reported in the first column of Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 – Climate anomalies and international migration: baseline estimations 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) 
Bilateral migration flows ij (in log) 
Baseline 
PREC PREC PREC TEMP TEMP TEMP PREC/ TEMP 
PREC/ 
TEMP 
GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) -0.211** 
(0.0759) 
-0.33*** 
(0.0862) 
-0.34*** 
(0.0867) 
-0.33*** 
(0.0925) 
-0.32*** 
(0.0901) 
-0.33*** 
(0.0903) 
-0.32*** 
(0.0895) 
-0.34*** 
(0.0870) 
-0.33*** 
(0.0921) 
Employment rate difference ij (lag 1) 
0.024*** 
(0.00698) 
0.0234* 
(0.013) 
0.0238* 
(0.0134) 
0.0246* 
(0.0133) 
0.0244* 
(0.0132) 
0.0240* 
(0.0131) 
0.0236* 
(0.0137) 
0.0229* 
(0.0132) 
0.0235* 
(0.0137) 
Irrigated land % i (change lag2 - lag1) 
-0.17*** 
(0.0575) 
-0.0124 
(0.128) 
-0.0226 
(0.127) 
-0.0213 
(0.128) 
-0.0175 
(0.125) 
-0.0196 
(0.126) 
-0.0140 
(0.125) 
-0.0281 
(0.128) 
-0.0178 
(0.125) 
Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 
0.519*** 
(0.0314) 
0.608*** 
(0.0374) 
0.608*** 
(0.0374) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
Distance ij (ln) 
-0.51*** 
(0.139) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.355** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
Common language (dummy) 
0.637*** 
(0.155) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
Precipitation (mean past 3years; 
absolute value in mm)  
-0.00024 
(0.00022)        
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 
3years; absolute value in mm)   
-0.00047 
(0.00029)     
0.0006** 
(0.00024)  
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 
3years; % value wrt mean 1961-1990)    
-0.302 
(0.331)     
-0.263 
(0.373) 
Temperature (mean past 3years; 
absolute value in °C)     
0.0339 
(0.0908)     
Temperature anomalies (mean past 
3years; absolute value in °C)      
0.0985 
(0.0933)  
0.258** 
(0.104)  
Temperature anomalies (mean past 
3years; % value wrt mean 1961-1990)       
0.00622 
(0.0055)  
0.00780 
(0.00542) 
Precipitation * Temperature anomalies 
(mean past 3years; absolute value in 
mm) 
       
-0.0022 
*** 
(0.00059) 
 
Precipitation * Temperature anomalies 
(mean past 3years; % value wrt mean 
1961-1990) 
        
-0.0127 
(0.0349) 
Constant 8.184*** 6.547*** 6.576*** 6.545*** 6.023*** 6.455*** 6.436*** 6.465*** 6.515*** 
 (1.389) (1.359) (1.337) (1.342) (1.648) (1.367) (1.377) (1.349) (1.344) 
Observations 15,021 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 
R-squared 0.846 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.838 0.837 
Note: dependent variable ln(migration flows ij +1)t. Regressions include origin country fixed effects and 286 (26x11) destination-country-by-year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country of destination in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population of destina-
tion countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Estimation results for the non-climatic covariates are in line with expectations. The size of 
bilateral migration flows is decreasing in the GDP per capita of origin countries; our proxy for 
the country of origin level of development. The larger is the difference in employment rate 
between origin and destination countries the larger is bilateral migration. A negative coeffi-
cient is associated with the variable capturing improvement in irrigated agricultural land; this 
variable captures the investment efforts undertaken by private and public agents in the agri-
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cultural sector which plays a crucial role in most of the origin countries included in our sam-
ple. As highlighted in previous studies (Pedersen et al 2008), migration networks play a cru-
cial role in channelling immigration flows; in our baseline model the bilateral stock of already 
established migrants is the strongest determinant of subsequent bilateral flows. Distance is 
negatively associated with the size of the flows, while a common language between origin 
and destination countries has a positive effects on immigration flows.  
We firstly proceed with the inclusion in the baseline model of simple measures of climate 
variability – precipitation and temperature anomalies with respect to the long term mean in 
absolute and percentage values17. The results reported in Table 3.1 suggest that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between climate anomalies in the origin country and inter-
national outmigration flows. Note that the joint inclusion in the baseline model of both tem-
perature and precipitation anomalies in absolute values occurred in the previous 3 years 
(Mod 1 PREC/TEMP) and their interaction shows that climatic anomalies are significantly 
associated with larger migration flows; the estimated coefficient on the interaction effect sug-
gests a mitigation effects if anomalies occurs jointly (i.e. when an increase in temperature is 
associated with an increase in precipitation).  
As remarked above, the possibility of individuals to rely on a network of family and friends 
who reside in other locations (migration networks) might greatly affect their choices in terms 
of adaptation strategy to changes in climatic conditions. The results reported in Table 3.2 
suggests that temperature anomalies occurred in the past 3 (or 5) years are significantly as-
sociated with higher migration flows but the existence of dense bilateral network of already 
established migrants seems to mitigate the effect. 
Table 3.2 – Temperature anomalies and international migration: the role of migrant 
networks 
Dependent variable: (4) (5) (4 bis) (5 bis) (6) (7) 
Bilateral migration flows ij (in log) TEMP TEMP TEMP TEMP TEMP TEMP 
GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) -0.304*** (0.0892) 
-0.302*** 
(0.0876) 
-0.272*** 
(0.0858) 
-0.270*** 
(0.0837) 
-0.292*** 
(0.0999) 
-0.303*** 
(0.105) 
Employment rate difference ij (lag 1) 0.0261* (0.0132) 
0.0262* 
(0.0130) 
0.0301** 
(0.0127) 
0.0301** 
(0.0121) 
0.0249* 
(0.0136) 
0.0245* 
(0.0135) 
                                               
17
 In Table 3.1 we report only estimates for climatic variable specified as averages for the 3 years before the ob-
served migration flows.   Estimates for 1-year and 5-years lagged climate anomalies have been computed and 
provide qualitatively similar results (available from the authors upon request). 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 23 
Irrigated land % i (change btw lag 2 - lag 1) -0.0114 (0.123) 
-0.0159 
(0.123) 
-0.0222 
(0.126) 
-0.0399 
(0.120) 
-0.00852 
(0.126) 
-0.0103 
(0.125) 
Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 0.627*** (0.0352) 
0.633*** 
(0.0344) 
0.674*** 
(0.0312) 
0.698*** 
(0.0303) 
0.608*** 
(0.0372) 
0.608*** 
(0.0372) 
Distance ij (ln) -0.334** (0.148) 
-0.326** 
(0.149) 
-0.276* 
(0.158) 
-0.245 
(0.160) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
Common language (dummy) 0.485*** (0.141) 
0.477*** 
(0.140) 
0.432*** 
(0.138) 
0.403*** 
(0.134) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
0.511*** 
(0.146) 
Temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) 
0.0205*** 
(0.00636)  
0.0659** 
(0.0248)  
0.0294 
(0.0254)  
Temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) * Network migrants ij 
-0.0036*** 
(0.00095)  
-0.0133*** 
(0.00346)    
Temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) * GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln)     
-0.00386 
(0.00373)  
Temperature anomalies (mean past 5years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990)  
0.0277*** 
(0.00835)  
0.0902** 
(0.0377)  
0.0224 
(0.0411) 
Temperature anomalies (mean past 5years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) * Network migrants ij  
-0.005*** 
(0.00137)  
-0.0194*** 
(0.00411)   
Temperature anomalies (mean past 5years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) * GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln)      
-0.00231 
(0.00687) 
Temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) (squared)   
-0.00022** 
(8.76e-05)    
Temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) (squared) * Network migrants ij 
(1990s; ln) 
  
6.17e-05*** 
(2.03e-05)    
Temperature anomalies (mean past 5years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) (squared)    
-0.00038** 
(0.000158)   
Temperature anomalies (mean past 5years; % value wrt 
mean 1961-1990) (squared) * Network migrants ij 
(1990s; ln) 
   
0.00011*** 
(2.93e-05)   
Constant 6.019*** (1.375) 
5.905*** 
(1.376) 
5.019*** 
(1.478) 
4.564*** 
(1.508) 
6.279*** 
(1.422) 
6.334*** 
(1.440) 
Observations 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 
R-squared 0.839 0.839 0.840 0.842 0.837 0.837 
Note: dependent variable ln(migration flows ij +1)t. Regressions include origin country fixed effects and 286 (26x11) destination-country-by-year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country of destination in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population of destina-
tion countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This results might be due to the “insurance” effects played by migrant networks through re-
mittances (as in Yang and Choi 2007). We find evidence of non-linear effects: for example, 
using estimates from model (4bis), a network which is 1% larger that the mean value of our 
sample implies that the average temperature anomaly (approx. 5%) leads to a bilateral out-
migration flow which is 4% larger.  
While the effects of temperature anomalies do not seems to depend on the relative level of 
development (as proxied by GDP per capita in the origin country; see model 6 and 7 in Table 
3.2); precipitation anomalies represents a push factor of bilateral migration flows only in poor 
countries (Table 3.3).   
Table 3.3 – Precipitation anomalies and international migration: the role of the level of 
development 
Dependent variable: (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bilateral migration flows ij (in log) PREC PREC PREC PREC PREC 
GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) -0.304*** (0.0867) 
-0.253*** 
(0.0890) 
-0.322*** 
(0.0891) 
-0.337*** 
(0.0864) 
-0.325*** 
(0.0887) 
Employment rate difference ij (lag 1) 0.0232* (0.0134) 
0.0233* 
(0.0132) 
0.0260* 
(0.0135) 
0.0251* 
(0.0135) 
0.0253* 
(0.0131) 
Irrigated land % i (change btw lag 2 - lag 1) -0.0290 (0.127) 
-0.0277 
(0.128) 
0.381** 
(0.158) 
0.339 
(0.231) 
0.303 
(0.233) 
Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 0.608*** (0.0374) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
0.608*** 
(0.0374) 
0.608*** 
(0.0373) 
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Distance ij (ln) -0.356** (0.148) 
-0.355** 
(0.148) 
-0.357** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
-0.356** 
(0.148) 
Common language (dummy) 0.512*** (0.146) 
0.513*** 
(0.146) 
0.510*** 
(0.146) 
0.510*** 
(0.146) 
0.510*** 
(0.146) 
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; absolute value 
in mm) 
0.00237* 
(0.00119)   
-0.000392 
(0.000309)  
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; absolute value 
in mm) * GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) 
-0.000398** 
(0.000160)     
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 5years; absolute value 
in mm)  
0.00599*** 
(0.00120)   
-0.000256 
(0.000343) 
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 5years; absolute value 
in mm) * GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln)  
-0.000890*** 
(0.000182)    
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; abs value in 
mm) * change in irrigated land i (% lag 2 - lag 1)    
-0.00471** 
(0.00197)  
Precipitation anomalies (mean past 5years; abs value in 
mm) * change in irrigated land i (% lag 2 - lag 1)     
-0.00412* 
(0.00231) 
Constant 6.343*** (1.357) 
6.031*** 
(1.391) 
6.458*** 
(1.348) 
6.530*** 
(1.333) 
6.478*** 
(1.360) 
Observations 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 
R-squared 0.838 0.838 0.837 0.838 0.837 
Note: dependent variable ln(migration flows ij +1)t. Regressions include origin country fixed effects and 286 (26x11) destination-country-by-year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country of destination in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population of destina-
tion countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In our analysis the threshold of GDP per capita below which anomalies are positively associ-
ated with migration outflows is approximately 1700 current US dollars (which includes most 
African countries and large countries such as China, Philippines). The outmigration-impact of 
large precipitation anomalies is – as one should intuitively expect – larger for countries which 
mostly rely on rain-fed agriculture (Table 3.3, last two columns). 
The results highlighted so far are based on the assumption of a symmetric effects of climate 
anomalies of different sign (positive and negative). It is hard to believe that, for instance, a 
20% contraction of annual rain will produce the same aggregate effects of a 20% increase of 
yearly precipitation in a poor country where agriculture is rain-fed. Our next step is to con-
sider explicitly the potentially different effects of climate anomalies of different sign18. The 
results are presented in Table 3.419.  
Table 3.4 – Climate anomalies and international migration: positive vs. negative 
shocks 
Dependent variable: 
Bilateral migration flows ij (in log) 
(8) 
TEMP 
(9) 
TEMP 
(9) 
PREC 
                                               
18
 To our knowledge this is the first study which explicitly considers the asymmetric effect of positive versus nega-
tive temperature and precipitation anomalies. 
19
 For the sake of space we present only estimations where climate anomalies are specified as 3-years average 
(lagged) expressed in % with respect to each origin country’s 1961-1990 mean. Results for 1-year lagged anoma-
lies and for 5-years averages are (qualitatively) consistent with those showed in Table 3.4 and are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) -0.313***  (.089) 
-0.279***   
(.010) 
-0.331***  
(.087) 
Employment rate difference ij (lag 1) 0.0288**  (.013) 
0.0263*  
(.0137) 
0.0249*   
(.0134) 
Irrigated land % i (change btw lag 2 - lag 1) -0.0320  (.123) 
-0.0106  
(.126) 
1.10e-05  
(.132) 
Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 0.676***  (.032) 
0.608***  
(.0374) 
0.591***  
(.0404) 
Distance ij (ln) -0.268  (.159) 
-0.355**  
(.148) 
-0.358**  
(.147) 
Common language (dummy) 0.427***  (.139) 
0.509***  
(.146) 
0.503***  
(.146) 
Positive temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt mean 1961-1990) 0.0615*** (.015) 
0.0604*  
(.034)  
Negative temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; % value wrt mean 1961-1990) 0.162**  (.0735) 
0.284*  
(.144)  
Positive temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; %) * Network migrants ij -.0121***  (.003)   
Negative temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; %) * Network migrants ij -.0252** (.009)   
Positive temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; %) * GDP pc i (lag 1; ln)  -0.0094*  (.0048)  
Negative temperature anomalies (mean past 3years; %) * GDP pc i (lag 1; ln)  -0.0386*  (.0210)  
Positive precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; %)   -0.174  (.505) 
Negative precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; %)   -2.352**  (1.037) 
Positive precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; %) * Network migrants ij   -0.0538  (.0805) 
Negative precipitation anomalies (mean past 3years; %) * Network migrants ij   0.368*  (.179) 
Constant 5.120*** (1.471) 
6.178*** 
(1.381) 
6.602*** 
(1.326) 
Observations 7,598 7,598 7,598 
R-squared 0.840 0.838 0.838 
Note: dependent variable ln(migration flows ij +1)t. Regressions include origin country fixed effects and 286 (26x11) destination-country-by-year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country of destination in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population of destina-
tion countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
It is interesting to notice that negative temperature anomalies have larger impacts on out-
migration than positive temperature anomalies. Previous results on the “mitigation” effects of 
established migrant networks on bilateral outflows are confirmed. The size of climate-induced 
outflows - when we consider temperature anomalies - is decreasing in GDP per capita of 
origin countries; this result seems to confirm the hypothesis that population of less developed 
areas are more likely to cope with climatic shocks by adopting relocation strategies.  
With respect to precipitation anomalies (column 9 Prec), we find that shocks are significantly 
associated with outmigration only when they have a negative sign. Interestingly, negative 
precipitation anomalies induce more international migration in origin countries that have lar-
ger networks of established migrants – i.e. international migration is “channelled” through 
existing bilateral migration corridors. This result is in line with case studies (for instance 
McLeman et al 2008) that show that migration is a feasible and affordable adaptation strat-
egy almost exclusively when individual have already established ties – family and friends 
ready to assist them - in other locations. The important corollary of this empirical evidence is 
the fact that it is likely that future climate-induced migration flows will follow “beaten paths” 
rather than create new ones. 
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Finally, we analyze the impact on bilateral outmigration flows of extreme climate events oc-
curring in the past 3 or 5 years in the country of origin (Table 3.5)20.  
Table 3.5 – Extreme climate anomalies and international migration 
Dependent variable: 
Bilateral migration flows ij (in log) 
(10) 
PREC 
(11) 
PREC 
(12) 
PREC 
(13) 
PREC 
(14) 
PREC 
(10) 
TEMP 
(11) 
TEMP 
(12) 
TEMP 
GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) 
 
-.32*** 
(.090) 
-.32*** 
(.091) 
-.32*** 
(.090) 
-.32*** 
(.090) 
-.32*** 
(.084) 
-.314*** 
(.089) 
-.32*** 
(.089) 
-.27*** 
(.089) 
Employment rate difference ij (lag 1) 
 
.0256* 
(.0135) 
.0247* 
(.0132) 
.0260* 
(.0134) 
.0232* 
(.0133) 
.0258* 
(.0136) 
.0227* 
(.0131) 
.0224* 
(.0130) 
.0243* 
(.0133) 
Irrigated land % i (change btw lag 2 - lag 1) -.0201 (.127) 
-.0187 
(.127) 
-.0214 
(.127) 
-.0292 
(.123) 
-.0106 
(.129) 
-.00609 
(.130) 
-.0179 
(.127) 
-.0222 
(.127) 
Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 
 
.608*** 
(.0373) 
.608*** 
(.0373) 
.608*** 
(.0373) 
.616*** 
(.0369) 
.602*** 
(.0375) 
.564*** 
(.0392) 
.568*** 
(.0397) 
.608*** 
(.0373) 
Distance ij (ln) 
 
-.357** 
(.148) 
-.356** 
(.148) 
-.357** 
(.148) 
-.353** 
(.147) 
-.358** 
(.148) 
-.352** 
(.148) 
-.350** 
(.148) 
-.356** 
(.148) 
Common language (dummy) .510*** (.146) 
.511*** 
(.146) 
.510*** 
(.146) 
.506*** 
(.146) 
.507*** 
(.146) 
.512*** 
(.146) 
.511*** 
(.146) 
.512*** 
(.146) 
Precipitation  
       
Extreme precipitation anomalies (above 90th percentile 
or below 10th percentile; average last 5 years; dummy) 
- .178** 
(.082)        
Extreme positive precipitation anomalies (above 90th 
percentile; average last 5 years; dummy)  
.00943 
(.218)       
Extreme negative precipitation anomalies (below 10th 
percentile; average last 5 years; dummy)   
- .226** 
(.097)      
Extreme positive precipitation anomalies (above 90th 
percentile; cumulated abs values in the last 3 years; 
dummy) 
   
.217** 
(.091)     
Extreme positive precipitation anomalies (above 90th 
percentile; cumulated abs values in the last 3 years; 
dummy) * Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 
   
- .040** 
(.017)     
Extreme negative precipitation anomalies (below 10th 
percentile; cumulated abs values in the last 3 years; 
dummy) 
    
- .181* 
(.093)    
Extreme negative precipitation anomalies (below 10th 
percentile; cumulated abs values in the last 3 years; 
dummy) * Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 
    
.0304** 
(.014)    
 
Temperature         
Extreme temperature anomalies (above or below 1 
StDev; cumulated abs values in the last 3 years; dum-
my) 
     
- .308** 
(.146)   
Extreme temperature anomalies (above or below 1 
StDev; cumulated abs values in the last 3 years; dum-
my) * Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 
     
.0503*** 
(.018)   
Extreme temperature anomalies (above 90th percentile 
or below 10th percentile; cumulated abs values in the 
last 3 years; dummy) 
      
- .299* 
(.155)  
Extreme temperature anomalies (above 90th percentile 
or below 10th percentile; cumulated abs values in the 
last 3 years; dummy) * Network migrants ij (1990s; ln) 
      
.0465** 
(.019)  
Extreme temperature anomalies (above 90th percentile 
or below 10th percentile; cumulated abs values in the 
last 5 years; dummy) 
       
.422* 
(.241) 
Extreme temperature anomalies (above 90th percentile 
or below 10th percentile; cumulated abs values in the 
last 5 years; dummy) * GDP per capita i (lag 1; ln) 
       
- .0567* 
(.032) 
Constant 6.45*** (1.366) 
6.46*** 
(1.368) 
6.45*** 
(1.367) 
6.36*** 
(1.361) 
6.46*** 
(1.355) 
6.66*** 
(1.355) 
6.66*** 
(1.355) 
6.04*** 
(1.439) 
Observations 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 
                                               
20
 As a robustness check we define alternative thresholds levels (standard deviation, 80th / 20th percentiles) and 
consider extreme anomalies occurring only in the year before migration flows observed. These additional estima-
tions are available upon request. 
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R-squared 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.837 
Note: dependent variable ln(migration flows ij +1)t. Regressions include origin country fixed effects and 286 (26x11) destination-country-by-year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country of destination in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population of destina-
tion countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Our climatic variable is specified as a dummy which is equal to 1 if the average precipitation 
(temperature), in the past 3 (or 5) years before the bilateral outmigration flow is registered,  is 
above the 90th  or below the 10th percentiles of the country of origin distribution of average 
yearly precipitation (temperature) in the last 4 decades. Let consider first extreme events 
related to average yearly rainfall. Model 10 shows that anomalies in the past 5 years which 
falls in the tails of the country of origin distribution  are associated with reduced outmigration 
flows. This result is entirely driven by the left-hand-side tail of the distribution – i.e. extreme 
negative precipitation anomalies - as confirmed by model 11 and model 12. The role played 
by migrant networks is fundamental and (interestingly) different according to the kind of pre-
cipitation shock experienced by the origin country. Positive precipitation anomalies above the 
90th percentile (floods for instance) represent a strong determinant of bilateral outmigration 
flows but not in the presence of dense migration networks. On the contrary, in case of ex-
treme negative precipitation anomalies migrant networks seems to “bridge” new international 
migration. A similar result is obtained when we consider extreme temperature anomalies - 
both for positive and negative shocks. This difference in the role that migration networks play 
in boosting or mitigating climate-induced migration might depend on their different economic 
and social impacts – for instance on vulnerable rural communities – or differences in the way 
such extreme shocks are perceived – temporary or persistent changes to local climate. A 
deep understanding of these interesting differences can be better acquired in our opinion 
through case studies and other qualitative methodological approaches. This complex role of 
networks emerges also from a comparison of studies based on individual sample surveys 
(see Piguet 2010 for a recent survey).21 
                                               
21
 A recent case study on Bangladesh (Paul 2005) based on household surveys in tornado-affected communities 
finds evidence against climate induced outmigration. Evidence based on a sample of 739 rural household in El 
Salvador (Halliday 2006), a country with large international migrant’s network,  finds a positive relationship be-
tween climate shocks and migration. Analogous results are found by Munshi (2003) for outmigration from Mexican 
provinces to the US. 
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4. Conclusive remarks 
In the past few years, media have often launched apocalyptic figures on migration flows that 
will be soon induced by the predicted changes in climatic conditions. Some of these figures 
were taken, often acritically, from important reports such as the Stern review (where between 
150 to 200 million environmental refugees are forecasted  in the next 30 years, a conserva-
tive assumption according to the authors) or other studies such as Christian Aid (2007). 
These estimates are often based on simplistic assumptions and what they actually measure 
is ‘population at risk’ (for instance resident in coastal floodplains at less than 1 meter of ele-
vation) rather than actual migrants. In fact, these estimates do not consider other forms of 
adaptation strategies and in particular do not consider how eventually relocation of popula-
tion affected by climatic changes will take place. 
In this paper we highlights some important aspects of the complex links between climatic 
changes and human migration. Whether or not migration is the adaptation strategies followed 
by affected individuals and their families depends on several features related to (i) climatic 
shocks (types, magnitude, signs, duration etc.), (ii) characteristics of the affected population 
(for instance household resource endowments before and/or after climatic shocks), (ii) insti-
tutions (local, national and international ability to prevent / limit the adverse effects of climatic 
shocks).  
The complexity of the links implies that our knowledge on this issue relies on the ability to 
pool results and information using different lenses (i.e. from different methodological ap-
proaches). We provide results employing a “macro” approach and looking at the relevance of 
climatic anomalies of different nature as determinant of international bilateral migration flows. 
Our results show that climate anomalies are positively related to international migration but it 
is fundamental to consider the type of changes (negative versus positive shocks to precipita-
tion and temperature) and where they happen (relatively poorer or richer countries / irrigated 
or rain-fed agricultural systems). We find evidence of an important and ambiguous role 
played by network of migrants in potential destination country. In some cases – such as 
negative precipitation anomalies and large temperature anomalies – networks seems to in-
curage more outmigration while in other cases – for instance large positive precipitation 
anomalies – we find opposite results.  
